# Cryptographic Assurance with Cryptol

Field arithmetic code is important and has edge cases lurking everywhere. Cryptol is a tool that can guarantee you’ve got the edge cases right! In this post, we continue reproducing an NCC Group Post about programming in z3. In our last post, we checked the implementation of part of the QUIC protocol. Now we’ll explore […]

Field arithmetic code is important and has edge cases lurking everywhere. Cryptol is a tool that can guarantee you’ve got the edge cases right!

In this post, we continue reproducing an NCC Group Post about programming in z3. In our last post, we checked the implementation of part of the QUIC protocol. Now we’ll explore an optimized implementation of field arithmetic.

I’d love it if you installed Cryptol and worked along, but I’ve reproduced everything here, so I’ll forgive you if you don’t.

I’m also going to take you through a mistake I actually made in the specification and explain how I debugged it. I promise I really made this mistake, and I didn’t just put it in there to make you feel good.

## I can’t believe you’ve done this.

For field arithmetic to work, we need to do math on big numbers. Loads of work have gone into making math on numbers up to 64 bits go fast. Beyond that, you won’t get much help from the hardware most of us have in our computers. That means that when we need to do fast math operations on bigger numbers, we’re forced to introduce risk into our code. Cryptol can help mitigate that risk.

So If I want to do math on 256-bit numbers, I’ve got a couple of choices:

• Build up some lists of bits (usually booleans) in my language, along with operations on them (bitvector approach)
• Map those operations onto the numbers that the computer represents

The first is far easier to get right. You get to treat your numbers uniformly, so you have far fewer edge cases to deal with. Unfortunately, it tends to be too slow and memory intensive. In many cases, you’ll end up using 8 or 16 times as much memory to represent your bit vectors as you would using the computer representations. The cost for computations could be even worse

That means that for most high-performance uses, we’ll need to map operations onto machine numbers. Bignum libraries such as GMP can do this reasonably well, but they’re generalized, and performance can often still be improved for specific applications.

## Setting up the types

The NCC post shows some go code and we’re going to work from the same code. Our goal is to implement this Galois field addition algorithm in Cryptol and show that it’s equivalent to a simpler, slower, operation over large bitvectors.

``````// Internal function for field addition.
// Parameters:
//   d    destination
//   a    first operand
//   b    second operand
//   mq   modulus definition parameter
func gf_add(d, a, b *uint64, mq uint64) {
// First pass: sum over 256 bits + carry
var cc uint64 = 0
for i := 0; i < 4; i ++ {
d[i], cc = bits.Add64(a[i], b[i], cc)
}

// Second pass: if there is a carry, subtract 2*p = 2^256 - 2*mq;
d, cc = bits.Add64(d, (mq << 1) & -cc, 0)
for i := 1; i < 4; i ++ {
d[i], cc = bits.Add64(d[i], 0, cc)
}

// If there is an extra carry, then this means that the initial
// sum was at least 2^257 - 2*mq, in which case the current low
// limb is necessarily lower than 2*mq, and adding 2*mq again
// won't trigger an extra carry.
d += (mq << 1) & -cc
}

func gf_sub(d, a, b *uint64, mq uint64) {
// First pass: difference over 256 bits + borrow
var cc uint64 = 0
for i := 0; i < 4; i ++ {
d[i], cc = bits.Sub64(a[i], b[i], cc)
}

// Second pass: if there is a borrow, add 2*p = 2^256 - 2*mq;
// i.e. we subtract 2*mq.
d, cc = bits.Sub64(d, (mq << 1) & -cc, 0)
for i := 1; i < 4; i ++ {
d[i], cc = bits.Sub64(d[i], 0, cc)
}

// If there is an extra borrow, then this means that the
// subtraction of 2*mq above triggered a borrow, and the first
// limb is at least 2^64 - 2*mq; we can subtract 2*mq again without
// triggering another borrow.
d -= (mq << 1) & -cc
}``````

It’s good to set up the types, and try to understand how they correlate to numbers first. Doing this right up front can save a lot of trouble in the future.

The inputs are big numbers of size 4*64. We’ll give this a type alias so we can reuse it easily.

``Type BN = ``

That’s a transparent alias in Cryptol, BN can be used interchangeably with 

We’ll state a couple of properties about what that type “means”. In general, it’s meant to be a way to split up a longer number into 64 bit chunks. Let’s record that, along with a property

``````bn_to_sequence : BN -> [4*64]
bn_to_sequence bn = join bn

sequence_to_bn : [4*64] -> BN
sequence_to_bn seq = split seq

property bn_roundtrip bn = bn == bn_to_sequence (sequence_to_bn bn)
``````

The property is a “roundtrip” property, stating that if we encode a long sequence as a BN and then convert back, we end up back where we started.

``````Main> :prove bn_roundtrip
Q.E.D.
(Total Elapsed Time: 0.006s, using "Z3")
``````

Woah, that went fast. I bet Cryptol knows some properties about join split and reverse that it can simplify away.

It’s good to have these “denotations” for the BV type. They will serve as specs as we start to implement operations.

Looks like we’re going to need an implementation of Bits.add before we go further.

``````bits_add : {n} (fin n)=> [n] -> [n] -> Bit -> (Bit,[n])
bits_add x y cin = ([email protected], drop z)
where
z : [n+1]
z = zext x + zext y + zext [cin]
``````

We can do it as a 65 bit addition in Cryptol. Where the 65th bit gets the final carry from adding two 64 bit numbers. If this were the actual function we were specifying we might want to make it look more like the original. We’ll do that for the other function. There’s some new Cryptol stuff here too. We see the `zext` function, which makes use of Cryptol types to automatically add zeros to the most significant digits in order to make the value the length that cryptol expects it to be, without changing the value itself.

In this case, since we’ve said `z` has length `n+1 `we know that the arguments to the addition must also have length `n+1`. We also see the drop function, which drops values from the front, in order to get the right length. In this case, we do that because the carry is in the 0th index, but we don’t want to include it in the sum portion of the return.

With that implemented, we can start to look at the body of the `gf_add` function. We’ll try to treat each loop separately, since they might also be useful on their own.

The first part of the `gf_add` function is doing a straight addition of the two numbers. We’ll implement that with the following cryptol:

``````bn_add : BN -> BN -> (Bit, BN)
bn_add a b = (drop cc, d.1)
where
cc : Bit
cc  =  # d.0

d : (Bit, )
[email protected] = bits_add ([email protected]) ([email protected]) ([email protected])
``````

We’ve got lots of Cryptol here. Let’s break it down and explain some things.

`drop cc` drops the first value in the sequence. That’s the initial 0 carry, there’s no reason to return it. For the computation, we really only need the last carry, but we keep them all so that later we can see how many carries are exercised.

`d.1` takes the second item of tuple (or pair) containing the value and the carry. That matches up with our `bits_add` implementation which returns a pair of the carry and the result.

We start our list of all of the carries off with zero, and then build the rest from the 0th indices of `d.` Cryptol is wildly polymorphic so we can do.

``````Main> [(0,1),(2,3)].0
[0, 2]``````

Finally we construct a sequence d, which refers back to the list of carry results.

This is a lot to take in, so let’s write a property to be sure we got it right.

``property bn_add_correct x y = sequence_to_bn (bn_to_sequence x + bn_to_sequence y)  == (bn_add x y).1``

We’ll prove it in the REPL.

``````Main> :prove bn_add_correrct
Counterexample
[0b1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001,
0b0000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b1111111111111011111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000]
[0b1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111,
0b1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111,
0b1111100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000111111111111111,
0b1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000] = False
(Total Elapsed Time: 0.072s, using "Z3")
``````

Or try to at least. We got something wrong. The counterexample provides an input that violates the property, but it looks like it’d be hard to figure out what went wrong. Sometimes a good thing to do is use simpler test cases to learn more. Let’s add 1 + 1.

``````Main> bn_add_correct (sequence_to_bn (zext 1)) (sequence_to_bn (zext 1))
True
``````

Our property is `True` for those values, so things are partially right at least. Let’s try something that triggers a carry, since that’s an obvious place we might make a mistake.

``````Main> bn_add_correct (sequence_to_bn (zext (1 # (0 : )))) (sequence_to_bn (zext (1 # (0 : ))))
False
``````

Narrowing it down… let’s look at the two sides of our property individually and see if we can spot the problem.

``````Main> sequence_to_bn ((zext (1 # (0 : ))) + (zext (1 # (0 : ))))
Showing a specific instance of polymorphic result:
* Using '1' for type argument 'front' of '(Cryptol::#)'
* Using '1' for type argument 'front' of '(Cryptol::#)'
[0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000]
``````

Ok, that worked pretty well. We can see that the bit carried from the 4th item to the third. Let’s try our function.

``````Main> bn_add (sequence_to_bn (zext (1 # (0 : ))))  (sequence_to_bn (zext (1 # (0 : ))))
(0x8,
[0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
0b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000])
``````

Oh! The carry went the other way, falling off the end of the operation and returning as a set bit for the final carry (`0x08` in binary is `0b1000`).

Now we just need to spend some time thinking about if our spec or implementation is wrong.

It seems likely that it was our specification. We (look I included you when “we” made a mistake) made an assumption about the representation of BN before we knew what was intended by the implementation. The implementation carries from the 0th index increasing through the sequence. The carry in our Cryptol addition went the other way though. Byte-ordering is a notoriously tricky bit of operations like this, and here it is, striking again!

``````bn_to_sequence : BN -> [4*64]
bn_to_sequence bn =  join (reverse (bn))

sequence_to_bn : [4*64] -> BN
sequence_to_bn seq = reverse (split (seq))
``````

We used reverse because the function seems to be looping from zero, carrying up with the index. That means that the 0th number will be the least significant. Cryptol does have a built-in bit-order for constants and operators. We can check this in the repl.

``````Main> (1 : ) @ 0
False
Main> (1 : ) @ 7
True
``````

The least significant digit is at index 7, so we’ll get the order wrong if we don’t reverse our BN first.

Let’s try our proof again and see if that fixed it.

``````Main> :prove bn_add_correct
Q.E.D.``````

All good! On with the post!

## Specifying the gf_add function (finally)

There are two more passes. If there was a carry resulting from the first addition, we add `2*mq` and propagate that. If there’s still a carry, we repeat the addition, but this time (the comments say) we don’t need to repeat the carry. Since we’re not actually doing anything that our add function can’t do we can define `gf_add`. We’re going to make `mq` the first argument though, so we can more easily set it to a fixed value when we’re using it. We’re also returning all of the carries.

gf_add :  -> BN -> BN -> (BN, Bit)

gf_add mq a b = (ds3, ccs1 # ccs2) where

(ccs1, ds1) = bn_add a b

(ccs2, ds2) = bn_add ds1 (update zero 0 (((mq : ) << 1) && -(zext [(ccs1!0)])))

ds3 = update ds2 0 ([email protected] + (((mq : ) << 1) && -(zext [(ccs2!0)])))

This looks similar to the Go implementation. We have to use subscripts as the variables update them because Cryptol is functional and doesn’t allow you to shadow names. It also looks a bit shorter than the code in go. One reason is that we pulled the two loops out into the `bn_add` function. The other is that we removed the special case in the go code, instead using the `update` function in Cryptol to allow us to reuse the code from the first loop.

One thing I thought a little mystifying in the implementation was the pattern.

``(((mq : ) << 1) && -(zext [(ccs2!0)])``

It’s being a little tricky with the shift and the mask. I think this is to avoid introducing side-channels, but we can prove it is equivalent to something that has side channels and is easier to read. We can write a little property:

``````property mq_mask_correct cc mq = ((mq : ) << 1) && -(zext [cc]) == if cc then 2 * mq else 0
``````

And prove it.

``````Main> :prove mq_mask_correct
Q.E.D.
(Total Elapsed Time: 0.007s, using "Z3")
``````

It’s nice to do this kind of thing as you go, because if you make a mistake it’s helpful to know that some of your implementation is definitely right.

Now that we’ve got the implementation done we can write a correctness property for it. First let’s write a version of our function that operates on and returns bitvectors:

``gf_add_bv x y = bn_to_sequence ((gf_add mqc (sequence_to_bn x) (sequence_to_bn y))).0``

Then we can line it up with an operation over long sequences.

``property gf_add_correct x y = (((zext x) : ) + (zext y)) % pc == (zext (gf_add_bv x y)) % pc``

We have to do the modulus on both sides because the `gf_add` function doesn’t fully reduce. This is a pretty common trick to avoid doing expensive operations until they’re actually necessary.

We can prove it pretty quickly, surprisingly.

``````Main> :prove gf_add_correct
Q.E.D.
(Total Elapsed Time: 13.243s, using "Z3")
``````

The NCC post said it takes a few hours. The difference could either be that Cryptol is leveraging built-in simplifications, resulting in a better goal for Z3, or that Z3 itself has improved for this problem since the NCC post was written.

Nice! All done! Looks like the algorithm is in good shape. Regardless, we’ve proved an algorithm, not an implementation. What if someone made a mistake writing this down in C, Rust, or their language of choice?

## Tying it to implementation

There are two ways we could tie a spec like this to an implementation

• Proofs, using a tool like SAW
• Test cases
• Both! (Recommended)

That was 3, I guess. The recommended order (from me) is tests first, then proofs.

Big words from someone who spends their days writing proofs! Why would I make this recommendation?

Tests give immediate feedback, and every developer already understands how to work with them. This is in contrast to proofs, which will often require learning an additional tool or two, along with a paradigm for reasoning. Tests are generally far quicker to develop than proofs, and easier to update. They also test cover “full stack” and can catch bugs in compilers or even hardware, if bugs exist.

Proofs, on the other hand, will give a higher assurance of correctness, but in general will take longer and be harder to interact with. In this case, writing a proof of a C program wouldn’t be much harder than the work we just did.

With the implementation we just made, we can automatically generate some tests to cover the behavior of various carry combinations. First we’ll define a property that’s true if it matches the supplied carry.

``````carry_eq p c x y r = p c / ((gf_add mqc x y).1 == c) / ((gf_add mqc x y).0 == r)
``````

We did something a little funny here. We take a predicate on the carries, so we can say something like, “I want a carry pattern where the 0th bit is 1”.

We also add an argument r for convenience.

Then we can ask the solver to give us a satisfying input:

``````Main> :sat (carry_eq (c -> c @ 0 ==True))
Satisfiable
(carry_eq (c -> c @ 0 == True))
0x80
[0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000000000000,
0x0000000000000000]
[0xffff7fffffffffff, 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000000000000,
0x0000000000000000]
[0xffff7ffffffffffe, 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000000000,
0x0000000000000000] = True
``````

That tells us the arguments supplied to carry_eq, as well as the result!

It’s worth noting again how much less verbose our approach was than doing things directly in z3 syntax. Our whole effort took around 50 lines of code (closer to 60 if you count the commands at the REPL). The z3 implementation took hundreds of lines.

In general, this is why I prefer interacting with Cryptol to interacting with the solver directly when I can manage it. Thanks for reading!

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